Translated by Ollie Richardson & Angelina Siard 03:30:45 10/05/2017 varjag2007su.livejournal.com Testimonies of the former employee of the Gestapo and an Abwehr Lieutenant Siegfried Müller given by him during an investigation on September 19th, 1946. “In 1940, during my work in the 4th department (Gestapo) of the Reich Main Security Office of Germany, one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists – Melnik – used to visit the head of the 4th department of Schröder, in his office of Gestapo where he received the necessary instructions for work. I often saw Melnik within the walls of the Gestapo, and according to Schröder he suggested to Melnik to create in Berlin a ‘Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs’, the activity of which would be led by German intelligence. From the same Schröder I knew that the Gestapo tried by creating the ‘Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs’ in Berlin to consolidate the Ukrainian nationalist movement, and through Melnik to put it under their own control.” Question: Did Melnik agree to head the “Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs”? Answer: “Yes, and such a bureau in Berlin was created with the assistance of the supporters of Melnik. However, at the end of 1940, i.e. after Melnik’s negotiations with Schröder, I was transferred for work in Abwehr, and in this connection I knew about the structure and practical work of the ‘Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs’.” Question: What was the relationship between Melnik and Bandera in the “Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs”? Answer: “I remember that during Melnik’s conversation with Schröder the latter suggested to Melnik to come to an agreement with Bandera about his participation in the work of the ‘Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs’. Schröder said that staff of Ukrainian nationalists will be needed by Germany for their use in the east, under the general leadership of the Reich Main Security Office, for work among the Ukrainian population. In November, 1940, I started to work in Abwehr where I learned that Melnik, besides communication with the Gestapo, also works with German military intelligence. He was a resident of ‘Abwehrstelle-Berlin’. I know about this because I personally worked as the referent in intelligence against the USSR in ‘Abwehrstelle-Berlin’.” Question: How did it became known to you? Answer: “I was working in the 1st intelligence department of the Abwehrstelle-Berlin as the referent in intelligence against the USSR. Working together with me in the same office was Major Pulyui, who Melnik was in personal contact with and presented intelligence information to him about the Soviet Union. Melnik received all espionage data about the USSR from his supporters – Ukrainian nationalists on the territory of Western Ukraine, and also from residents from the city Novy Zol (Czechoslovakia). In the affairs of Pulyui I saw the personal duty of Melnik about cooperation with ‘Abwehrstelle-Berlin’ with his photo in the appendix. Pulyui worked with Melnik under the pseudonym ‘Doctor Kukhert’. I don’t know Melnik’s pseudonym in the Abwehrstelle. From Abwehrstelle-Berlin I was sent to the eastern front to the German military intelligence bodies, in the structure of Abwehrkommando-304.” Question: And did you come across the activity of Ukrainian nationalists there? Answer: “In Abwehrkommando-304 – No.” Question: And later? Answer: “In 1944 when I was transferred from Abwehrkommando-304 to Abwehrkommando-202, I again learnt about saboteur work against the USSR by Ukrainian nationalists, but at this time not Melnik’s one, but Bandera’s supporters. In Abwehrkommando-202 I personally had to link the work of German reconnaissance bodies and Ukrainian nationalists.” Question: Who gave you the task to connect with Ukrainian nationalists? Answer: “In October, 1944, I was sent from Abwehrkommando-202 to the disposal of the infantry school in Libava. Without wishing to go to this work, I used my short holiday for a trip to Berlin, where I met familiar officers of the general-staff of the German army. At my request Major Lamerau cancelled my appointment in Libava and sent me to Abwehrkommando-202 instead, located at that time in Krakow. In the 1C department of the General Staff of the German Army I received full information about the military situation in the area of the central group of troops of the German Army and about the negotiations of our intelligence with Ukrainian nationalists on the joint fight against the Red Army.” Question: What instructions did you receive in the 1C department? Answer: “The deputy head of the 1C department of the General Staff for intelligence Major Lamerau, and Major Stolze told me that in October, 1944, the head of Abwehrkommando-202 Major Kirn established a connection with the southern staff of UPA and that he holds negotiations with Ukrainian nationalists on the involvement of insurgent units of UPA to carry out sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army under the leadership of Abwehrkommando-202. Upon arrival at the place I had to help Major Kirn with this work and to use the opportunities given to us to recruit staff from Ukrainian nationalists for sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army. Lamerau and Stoltz laid big hopes on the help of Ukrainian nationalists in the carrying out of sabotage work against the USSR, and considered that with good organization and leadership of the units of UPA it will be possible to spoil the plans of the Soviet command during offensive operations.” Question: When did you arrive in Abwehrkommando-202? Answer: “I arrived in Abwehrkommando-202 for work on December 1st, 1944, and started performing official duties. During the meeting with Major Kirn, he told me that in October, 1944, he had a meeting with the liaisons of the southern staff of UPA, together with which in the location of this Abwehrunit-206 he passed the front line and conducted negotiations with the southern staff of UPA.” Question: Where was the southern staff of UPA located? Answer: “As I was told by Major Kirn, the southern staff of UPA is located in the forests of the mountain district, near Lvov. He didn’t name those who are in the staff of UPA, however the matter of negotiations was transmitted in detail.” Question: What do you know about the content of negotiations with Major Kirn in the southern staff of UPA? Answer: “The command of UPA gave to Major Kirn basic consent to carry out joint work with German intelligence in the rear of the Red Army, but in return they laid out such conditions… The German army provides insurgent units of Ukrainian nationalists with regimentals, arms, means of communication, medicines, and money. As for practical work on the organization of sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, Ukrainian nationalists laid out such conditions: the German reconnaissance bodies must create in the territory occupied by Germans sabotage schools for Ukrainian nationalists and conduct training of nationalists in radio communication and military preparation. Sabotage units of Ukrainian nationalists will be subordinate to Abwehrkommando-202 in an operational sense, while the rest are subordinate to the authority of the staff of UPA. Having the appropriate authority of the General Staff of the German Army, Kirn accepted the conditions of Ukrainian nationalists and in return laid out in front of UPA the conditions of the German command. They were as follows: the southern staff of UPA has to the give at the disposal of Abwehrkommando-202 such a number of saboteurs as it considers necessary by the command of the Abwehrkommando-202. Abwehrkommando-202 reserves the right to complete sabotage units from these persons, and to define the place and objects for sabotage; Besides this, the staff of UPA must provide Abwehrkommando-202 with all espionage data on the Red Army available to them, and also information on the general activity of Ukrainian nationalists in the rear of the Red Army, on the area of the southern group of troops of the German army, i.e in an area from Warsaw to the Romanian border. The southern staff of UPA agreed to these conditions, and the decision was made on an exchange of representatives for communication between Abwehrkommando-202 and the southern staff of UPA. I was suggested by Kirn to occupy the post of officer of communication from Abwehrkommando-202 in the southern staff of UPA.” Question: Who from Ukrainian nationalists was sent for connection with Abwehrkommando-202? Answer: “At the end of 1944, appointed as the representative of the southern staff of UPA in Abwehrkommando-202 was professor Danyliv – nickname ‘Orel’, about 43 years old, of average height, a strong frame, dark hair, speaks the German, French, and English languages fluently, and he previously worked as a professor of philosophy at the Lvov university. He had an officer rank in UPA – Colonel.” Question: What sabotage work against the Soviet Union was carried out by Danyliv together with the Germans? Answer: “He rendered assistance to the command of Abwehrkommando-202 in recruitment, training and completing sabotage units of Ukrainian nationalists, and moving them to the rear of the Red Army for the conducting of sabotage. In December, 1944, the Reich Main Security Office released Stepan Bandera, who received a villa near Berlin by order of the 4-D department of the Gestapo. Bandera was under personal supervision since then, and worked according to the instructions of the newly appointed head of department 4-D Obersturmbannführer Wolf. In the same month Stepan Bandera arrived to the location of Abwehrkommando-202 in Krakow and personally gave instructions to Danyliv, and also to the prepared agents sent by us to the staff of UPA for communication. Thus, the sabotage work that was carried out in the rear of the Red Army by Ukrainian nationalists was authorized by Stepan Bandera, and was carried out under the leadership of German intelligence.” Question: Have you personally met Bandera during intelligence work? Answer: “Yes. On the occasion of Bandera’s arrival in Abwehrkommando-202, Major Kirn suited a banquet in the villa of our unit, which was located at Gartenstrasse 1 (near Krakow stadium), where Bandera, Major Kirn, and Professor Danyliv made speeches. There I got acquainted with Bandera, and then in some days we had a business meeting. On December 27, 1944, I prepared a unit of saboteurs for transfer to the rear of the Red Army with a special task. This unit consisted of three Ukrainian nationalists – Lopatinsky, ‘Demed’, and one radio operator whose surname I don’t remember. Stepan Bandera in my presence personally instructed these agents and sent through them an order to the staff of UPA to intensify sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army and to maintain regular radio communication with Abwehrkommando-202. I was presented to the group as the liaison officer of Abwehrkommando-202 appointed to the post of officer of communication in the staff of UPA, so that when I will arrive to the staff of UPA they could recognize me as the representative of Abwehrkommando-202. The entire group of Lopatinsky, transferred by me to the rear of the Red Army via German planes from the Krakow airfield to the region of Lvov, had to transfer to the staff of UPA one million rubles, medicines, regimentals, explosives, and a handheld transceiver.” Question: Was the radio communication between Abwehrkommando-202 and the staff of UPA established? Answer: “The radio communication between Abwehrkommando-202 and the staff of UPA existed since October, 1944, but this communication was carried out by means of 40 watt radio station with the call sign ‘Vera’. We thought that the 40 watt handheld transceiver was so powerful that it could lead to listening-in and deciphering at a great distance, so we sent a 3-watt station to Lopatinsky’s group that could work safely for a long time. As far as I know, Lopatinsky’s group didn’t arrive to the staff of UPA, and we considered that they were eliminated while landing by the counterintelligence of the Red Army.” Question: What sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army did the Abwehrkommando-202 carry out together with Ukrainian nationalists? Answer: “From the five sabotage schools that were controlled by Abwehrkommando-202, one, the ‘Moltke’ school run by me, up to April, 1945, prepared the training of saboteurs only from among Ukrainian nationalists. The recruitment of saboteurs was carried out by employees of Professor Danyliv with officers of Abwehrkommando-202. In addition, Abwehrunit-206, which was a part of Abwehrkommando-202, had a direct connection through the front line with insurgent units of UPA in the Carpathian Mountains. We recruited people from these insurgency units, trained them at sabotage schools for a short-term, and then used them for sabotage work in the rear of the Red Army.” Question: Which group of Ukrainian nationalists were transferred to the rear of the Red Army with sabotage tasks? Answer: “During the last months before the capitulation of Germany, 45 saboteurs from among Ukrainian nationalists studied at my sabotage school ‘Moltke’. A part of them totalling 25 people were sent to the school by the staff of UPA from the territories occupied by units of the Red Army, and others were enlisted from prisoner-of-war camps. The first group of saboteurs called ‘Paul-2’, consisting of 8 people, I transferred on April 7th, 1945, to the region of Sarny with the task to reestablish communication with the staff of the Volyn unit of UPA, and to conduct sabotage work on the railway line near Sarny… The second group called ‘Paul-3’, which also consisted of 8 people, was transferred by me on April 13th, 1945, from the Prague airfield to the district of Vladimir-Volynsky. All members of the group were natives of the rural areas of Vladimir-Volynsky. … The ‘Paul-3’ group had the task to carry out sabotage on the communications of the Red Army near Vladimir-Volynsky. The third sabotage group, which was called ‘Paul-1’, was transferred by me on April 20th, 1945, from the Prague airfield to the area of Kovel – 9 people. All members of the group were natives of the Kovel region. Due to the approaching final defeat of Germany, having carried out the transfer of the last group, on April 21st, 1945, I went underground to Prague and didn’t report to Abwehrkommando-202 anymore. I don’t know anything about the destiny and further actions of the group of Kirn. However, I do know that Ukrainian nationalists attempted to establishment communication with the command of the British-American troops. Danyliv and Burlay had the order from the staff of UPA to pass through the front line to reach British-American troops in order to inform them of their wish to adjust their own sabotage activities on the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the plans of British-American troops. A part of the group had to accompany Burlay to the Americans. Danyliv intended to flee to the allies together with Bandera. Knowing that I know both the English and French languages, Burlay offered me to join his groups and pass together to the Americans. At the beginning of April, 1945, Bandera received the order from the Reich Main Security Office to bring together all Ukrainian nationalists near Berlin and to defend the city from the approaching units of the Red Army. Bandera created units of Ukrainian nationalists, which worked as a part of the Volkssturm, and he himself fled. He left the villa of 4-D department and ran to Weimar. Burlay later told me that Bandera agreed with Danyliv to jointly transition to the side of the Americans…” September 19, 1946. Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine. – F. 57. – Op. 1. – D. 338. – L. 268-279 Copyright © 2017. All Rights Reserved.