The SBU is at the Disposal of the Polish Intelligence Agencies

The Security Service of Ukraine in late July took an active part in two operations to kidnap Russian citizens. Both failed, but the first, with 32 failed oil field guards detained in Belarus, was close to success.

I do not write that the SBU organised these operations, although in Ukraine, and in Russia, this is said almost at the official level. The SBU was only a key link. The level of organisation and coordination of actions of various intelligence agencies (at least the SBU and KGB of Belarus were highlighted) indicates that the operations were planned, organised, and coordinated by a third intelligence agency that had the ability to influence the behaviour of Ukrainian and Belarusian colleagues.

I believe that the planner, organiser, and coordinator was one (possibly two) of the Polish intelligence agencies. The operations were supposed to be carried out under the direction of the intelligence agency (Agencja Wywiadu), with the possible participation of the military intelligence service (Służba Wywiadu Wojskowego). For the counterintelligence, financial, and anti-corruption intelligence services also present in Poland, this would be clearly an irregular task.

Poland found itself in a critical geopolitical situation. Its American overlord is busy with its civil conflict, during which the confrontation of left-wing liberals and right-wing conservatives has gone far beyond the traditional struggle of Democrats vs Republicans, Biden vs Trump. This is a long-running internal conflict that will weaken America for a long time and distract its resources from foreign policy goals. The Democrats still somehow try to support client regimes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but even the reduced resources of the United States are not available to them in full. They can only use the State Department’s old practices and Soros’ basic structures. This is quite a lot, but it is not what it was when the entire power of the united West was thrown onto the scales.

Meanwhile, during their “honeymoon” with the United States, when Poland felt like it was the main ally of the hegemon within the EU and the main conductor of its policy in the post-Soviet space, the Poles managed to quarrel not only with Russia (which is natural for them), but also with Germany, and even turned France against themselves. Poland has found itself in a traditional unpleasant situation, when it is surrounded by countries whose relations, at the initiative of Warsaw, are completely damaged, and a distant ally can not provide support. This was the case at the end of the 18th century, on the eve of the Second World War, and the situation is repeated today. Knowing how everything ended earlier (but being unable to understand that it was their own fault), the Poles are afraid of a new partition.

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Poland tries to prevent a negative development of events for it in its traditional aggressive manner, which has repeatedly led the Polish state to collapse, but has remained the basis of Polish diplomacy. Poles see that the US is entering into a confrontation with the EU. They understand that Poland, as an ally within the EU, is important for the US today, but is not able to provide them with significant support. Therefore, Washington is not too interested in preserving the European position of Warsaw and may well exchange Poland for something more interesting for it during the bidding of global players (if there is one). To restore the US’ interest in Poland, Warsaw needs to quickly and dramatically strengthen itself.

How does it do this?

As I said, Poland has not changed over the centuries. It logically tries to strengthen itself by pushing Russia to the east, occupying the Intermariumand blocking Moscow’s economic and political ties with Berlin (and this time with Paris). To implement this plan, the “Lublin triangle” (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine) is being hastily created. It is obvious that for completeness, for complete coherence, it lacks Belarus.

The Poles have been working with Minsk for a long time, and they know the situation there well. It is no secret to them that in an attempt to distance himself from Moscow, Lukashenko himself raised the Maidan forces in Belarus that permeated the state apparatus, the information sphere, and represented by numerous NGOs. For a guaranteed victory of the Maidan in Minsk, it might be necessary to spend a couple of years on preparation. But Warsaw can’t wait. The results of the American election is unpredictable, and the option of an intra-American conflict growing into a fully-fledged civil war after the election is more than real. Then there will be no time for Polish ambitions. It can only rely on the support of Soros and the Democrats now. Poland needs a blitzkrieg – a lightning Maidan.

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Warsaw is confident of its ability to bring down Lukashenko (and with good reason). Who can prevent it? Russia. So it is necessary to create a conflict between Minsk and Moscow that will not allow Russia to come to the aid of Lukashenko, despite the understanding that the Maidan Belarusian regime will be at least no better, or even worse, than the Ukrainian one.

For this purpose, an operation was being prepared to export 32 Russian citizens through Belarus to Ukraine, 28 of whom Ukraine accuses of participating in hostilities in Donbass. I am sure that when now the SBU (or rather its so-called sources in the media, since the SBU itself officially denies this operation for the sake of appearance) takes everything upon itself and claims that the delay in Minsk happened by chance and that only because of this the operation failed, it is lying, shielding their Polish curators and their Belarusian agents. It was the arrest by Belarus and its extradition of these people to Ukraine that were the essence of the operation. It is no coincidence that before this, Lukashenko was pumped with disinformation about what Russia is preparing for him. In Warsaw and in Kiev, they were sure that the impulsive Lukashenko would extradite the detainees to show Putin that “it is not necessary to joke with him like this”. The Polish agents in the Belarusian government had to facilitate the adoption of such a decision.

If, a couple of days before the start of the Belarusian Maidan, Lukashenko had extradited three dozen Russian citizens who fought in Donbass to Ukraine, it would be extremely difficult for Putin to help him for purely internal political reasons (the people would not understand, saving a traitor from deserved punishment).

The second operation, to capture and extradite from Russia to Ukraine an unnamed leader of the Donbass militia, was clearly being prepared to support and continue the first. To begin with, the SBU would get a whole “criminal group”: the leader (who gave orders) and subordinates (who executed orders). The evidence extracted from them would have to complement and confirm each other. Then, the almost simultaneous abduction from Russian territory of three dozen volunteers who fought in Donbass and one of the leaders of the militia, would seriously undermine the authority of both the Russian security services and Putin personally. The pseudo-patriotic opposition would again start whining about the fact that the Russian government is in collusion with Kiev and Washington, dreams of “abandoning Donbass”, etc. Perhaps they would even try to organise unrest in the DPR/LPR and some speeches by former volunteers inside Russia. It is also very likely that the captured would try to extract confessions that they were the ones who shot down the Boeing above Donbass “on the orders of the Kremlin”.

In general, it was necessary to create a situation that Putin had no time for Lukashenko, so that Russia could not interfere in the situation in Belarus in the few critical days during which the Maidan was supposed to win. And Warsaw was preparing a blitzkrieg, a lightning Maidan. It didn’t have the resources for a long fight.

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I think the reason why the SBU was the main contractor is clear. Due to the relations that have been developing since Soviet times, the officers of the Ukrainian intelligence agencies have developed both personal connections and agents, both on the territory of Russia and Belarus (the opposite is also true). It is much easier for Ukrainians to work on the territory of the former USSR than for Poles. Well, as a bonus for participating in the operation, the SBU and the Kiev authorities received captured Russian citizens, which made it possible for Zelensky to blackmail the Kremlin and seek to hold the Normandy Four summit, which is so necessary for the Ukrainian President.

The FSB thwarted both operations, but judging by the amount of misinformation spread about them, the Polish organisers are trying to get their Ukrainian and Belarusian agents out of harm’s way. In any case, under the guise of failures, only the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defence Ministry, Burba, whose subordinates’ involvement in these operations is very doubtful, was dismissed in Ukraine. While in the completely illuminated SBU, no one was affected. Similarly, the information noise about the “insidious SBU” allows to distract attention from the Polish agents in Belarus, without whose participation it would be impossible to discredit Lukashenko.

Rostislav Ishchenko

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