Why Didn’t the Allies Storm Berlin?

For several years in a row I have written posts about this topic. Last year I put them together and on May 5th put them on LiveJournal. I monitored articles on this topic and realised that it’s possible to repeat this entry for a very long time. The relevance of the topic has not diminished over time.

I made my first blog entry on this topic back in 2011. Back then I wrote very concisely for a historically knowledgable audience. As it turned out, a significant part of readers do not understand hints simply because they do not know the main events of the Second World War. Therefore, the post became more detailed, grew and grew to its current size. I’ll start…

In May 1945, the capital of the Third Reich was stormed by fighters of the Red Army. Berlin lasted only seven days. Remember how much Sevastopol was defended, how much Stalingrad was defended…

The Germans fled rapidly. But why did the Red Army take Berlin. Why didn’t the allies do this?

The plan of the allies to abandon Stalin

The fact is that in the Berlin strategic operation, the losses of the USSR were significant, but in fact, during the assault on Berlin, by the standards of the Second World War – meagre. By the end of the war, the losses of the British Empire for just those who were killed (excluding prisoners and missing persons) exceeded 4 million people.

Therefore, I will start with the most naive argument, so as not to return to it again: in liberal and Vlasov circles, it is generally believed that the allies did not take Berlin because they were saving their soldiers.

This is nonsense!

According to the agreements reached by the heads of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain in the autumn of 1944, the border of the Soviet zone of occupation was to pass 150km west of Berlin.

I.e., according to the agreements, the allies should not take Berlin, but not out of pity for their troops, but for completely different reasons. However, they initially wanted to democratically violate the agreements and get ahead of the Red Army.

This is recognised even by the usually false Wikipedia:

“Roosevelt, Churchill, Eisenhower, and Montgomery believed that they, as the Western allies of the USSR, had the opportunity to take Berlin.
Back in late 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt on board the ‘Iowa’ battleship set the military a task:

We must reach Berlin. The US should take Berlin. The Soviets can take territory to the east.

Winston Churchill also considered Berlin to be the primary goal:

‘Soviet Russia has become a deadly threat to the free world. We must immediately create a united front against its rapid advance. This front in Europe should go as far east as possible. The main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin.’

Churchill insisted at the end of March and beginning of April 1945:

‘I … attach even more importance to entering Berlin… I think it is extremely important that we meet the Russians as far east as possible.’

According to Field Marshal Montgomery, Berlin could have been captured in the early autumn of 1944. Trying to convince the commander-in-chief of the need to storm Berlin, Montgomery wrote to him on September 18, 1944:

‘I think that the best object of the offensive is the Ruhr, and then to Berlin by the northern route… since time is of the utmost importance, we must decide that it is necessary to go to Berlin and end the war; everything else must play a secondary role.’

However, after an unsuccessful landing operation in September 1944, called ‘Market Garden’, which involved, in addition to the British, also American, as well as Polish paratroopers and units, Montgomery recognised:

‘Berlin was lost to us when we failed to develop a good operational plan in August 1944, after the victory in Normandy’.”

What is this “Market Garden” and why, unlike the “Overlord” plan, did it fail?

READ:  Young ATO Soldier Head-Butted a Ukrainian General For Defending the St. George's Ribbon

Dollar takes the cities?

In the summer of 1944, the allies conducted Operation Overlord – the Normandy landings. The losses of the British and Americans were minuscule, the losses of the Germans were monstrous: hundreds of thousands of them were captured, tens of thousands were missing…

Some say that this stunning success was facilitated by the betrayal of the German Generals. Even before the landing of the allies, German Generals colluded with them and made a lot of effort so that the “Atlantic wall” was not ready to repel the Anglo-American invasion. The main role in neutralising the German troops was assigned to Rommel. It is not surprising that to this day the glorification of the “Desert Fox” – Rommel – is one of any themes of Western novelists and cinematographers…

Shy of this version, western historians claim that the Germans’ lack of preparation in Normandy was due to differences between Rommel and Rundstedt.

In general, “Overlord” and the stop order for Hitler’s troops at Dunkirk are, in my opinion, two of the most mysterious topics of the Second World War that are ignored by historians.

In order to answer to why “Overlord” was successful for the allies, and “Market Garden” – carried out in much more favourable conditions – failed, I suggest that we start looking in Normandy. It was here, in the north of France, that Hitler sent Rommel to help Rundstedt. Let me remind you that shortly before the surrender of German troops in Africa, Rommel abandoned his troops and left on a plane for Germany.

German soldiers who started their service with Rommel in the Afrika Korps went into captivity, behind barbed wire. And Rommel himself – on vacation, on walks, on friendly meetings with the Goebbels family.

And it was during this period that the Germans had to develop a strategy for the defence of the French coast. This is how Aleksandr Bevin describes it in his book “10 Fatal Mistakes Made by Hitler”.

“Ironically, the two greatest tank commanders in history – Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel – disagreed on how to properly repel the allied invasion of France.

Guderian defended his position based on the experience of waging war in the east against the Red Army, and Rommel’s position was based on the experience of fighting in Africa against the western allies. They offered diametrically opposite solutions.”

It is generally clear what decision Guderian was talking about. Here is how General Chuikov describes it in his memoirs:

“By that time, Goebbels’ propaganda was vociferously praising the so-called ‘elastic defence’. In this defence, the Nazi command used the high mobility and manoeuvrability of its troops.

Its principle was based on a sudden change in action. First a planned withdrawal, then a sudden counter-attack, reinforced by mobile reserves or units hastily transferred from another section of the front.”

And further:

“…It is clear that the enemy in the new conditions does not cling to the territory. Perhaps, if the Nazis feel the threat of our offensive, they will hurry back to the next frontier again, just to save their forces. Forests and swamps will help them to manoeuvre unnoticed, organise their defence, and meet our advancing troops with an unexpected blow.”

Therefore, Guderian wrote that Panzergrenadier divisions “should be located far enough away from the so-called Atlantic wall that they can be easily transferred to the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s troops, as soon as it is determined.”

Rommel explained the impossibility of conducting such manoeuvres by referring to the superiority of the allies in aviation. Guderian believed that large tank formations could be moved at night. Subsequently, the operation in the Ardennes confirmed that Guderian was right.

Bevin claims that Rommel built his proposals based on the experience of fighting in north Africa. What were these suggestions?

READ:  Syrian Soldiers in Palmyra: Our Flag Resembles the One Used by Soviet Soldiers Who Stormed the Reichstag

Bevin writes:

“For Rommel, the days of mobile warfare were over – not only because of Anglo-American air superiority, but also because Germany could not keep up with the western allies in the production of tanks and armoured vehicles, which was more the result of a lack of oil than the actions of Anglo–American aviation.

The main thing in Rommel’s plans was that the Germans should correctly determine the place of landing of the allies. If the German troops cannot be moved to the desired point, they must be as close as possible to the enemy’s landing point. Rommel decided that the allies would land on the Pas de Calais opposite Dover.”

If he was based on his experience of fighting in north Africa, then why did he simultaneously think that the days of mobile warfare were over?

The war in north Africa is deep tank raids by relatively small tank groups in the absence of a solid front line. What does this have to do with Rommel’s intention to gather a bunch of people in one place on the coast itself?

Guderian, who discovered that Rommel had positioned Panzer divisions too close to the coast, wrote:

“It will not be possible to transfer them and enter the battle on any other sector of the front quickly enough if the enemy landed in some other place.”

As is now known, the landing of the allies was accompanied by a lot of mysterious incidents.

Mysteries of “Operation Overlord”

The commander-in-chief of Hitler’s forces in the west, Field Marshal Rundstedt, was informed on the evening of June 5th 1944 that the BBC radio station in London was transmitting an unusually large number of coded messages for the French Resistance and that the German radar stations between Cherbourg and Le Havre were being severely interfered with.

And at 22:00, a coded BBC message to the French Resistance was intercepted, meaning that the invasion was beginning, but Rundstedt, understandably, did not react in any way.

A little later, German radar detected an armada of ships moving towards the banks of Normandy. However, Rundstedt again pretended to be an idiot and, stating that the sailors had seen a pack of seagulls on the screens of their radar.

He didn’t even send out a reconnaissance plane.

At midnight, three allied airborne divisions started to disembark, one in northeast Caen in order to capture bridgeheads on the river between the city and the sea and two north of Carentan to help the marine landing force and prevent the enemy from moving reserves to the Cotentin Peninsula.
Major General Pemsel informed Rundstedt by phone that it appeared that a large-scale operation had started, but Rundstedt again did not react and brushed it off, saying that the landing was a “distraction”.

When at dawn the allied armada started landing, Rundstedt again “did not believe”.

It is only when the allies captured the bridgehead and secure it that Rundstedt started calling Hitler.

But Hitler was sleeping and the Generals “hesitated” to wake him up.

Hitler is asleep, Rommel is celebrating his wife’s birthday, and Rundstedt “doesn’t believe…”.

The allies land almost without losses. There was a serious fight only on the “Omaha beach”, where German teenagers, in their youth, without having understood the plan of the command, fought off the Americans for some time.

On June 29th 1944, Rommel and Rundstedt went to persuade Hitler to conclude a truce with the allies. Hitler didn’t agree.

Once Rundstedt and Rommel left, an “off-course” Vergeltungswaffe-2 landed on Hitler’s bunker. But Hitler remained in one piece. Therefore, on July 6th, the Chief of Staff of the Army of the Reserve and conspirator von Stauffenberg delivered a bomb to the Berghof to blow up Hitler.

On July 20th 1944, Stauffenberg detonated a bomb in Hitler’s bunker. However the Fuhrer survived!

READ:  How Soviet Intelligence Agencies Used the Legendary Farewell to OUN-UPA for Operational Games With the West

An offensive without the help of German Generals

Meanwhile, from Normandy, without meeting any serious resistance, the Anglo-Americans rushed to France and to the borders of Germany.

At this time, in the east, the Germans were biting into every inch, and in the west, the speed of the allied advance was limited solely by the capabilities of the rear units.

Simply put, if the ports of Normandy could handle the unloading of food, ammunition, and most importantly – fuel, and the rear units were able to deliver all this to the divisions that had left, the pace of the allied offensive could be much higher.

The victory achieved so easily created the illusion that the military and political leadership of the allies could easily obtain German capitulation.

After a brief discussion, they approved the plan for operation Market Garden. The idea was to deploy several divisions of paratroopers to capture the bridges over the Rhine and break through into German territory with a swift blow. After that, as the allies believed, the surrender of German soldiers and officers would become mass and Germany would be forced to capitulate. If the surrender was refused, the allies would have an open road to Berlin. Some say that, allegedly, the British commander-in-chief Montgomery, who actively insisted on carrying out this operation, “dreamed of a march to Berlin and the glory of Hitler’s conqueror”.

According to the plan, the Anglo-Americans hoped to end the war by taking Berlin by the end of December.

He really wanted to present the victory to his leaders and people for the Catholic Christmas. For Churchill and Roosevelt’s love for Christmas gifts, thousands of British and American paratroopers were washed in blood.

Operation Market Garden itself is described in detail.

The allied aerial-landing armada deployed a landing force, but there was no second Rommel and the Germans quickly surrounded and then destroyed the landing force. Thousands of elite Anglo-American soldiers were captured. A crushing and shameful defeat at the hands of an opponent who was already considered to be defeated.

Later, Western researchers called various reasons, but among them was the main one.

“In general, the Anglo-Americans clearly ignored the enemy and overestimated their capabilities. The optimistic mood formed in the headquarters of the western allies before the beginning of the autumn of 1944, led to the fact that the paratroopers were not able to do the task.”

Rommel, not waiting for the Americans, accused of treachery, took cyanide.
A few months later, in December, Model, still loyal to Hitler, was struck in the Ardennes. For the Americans, these battles were the bloodiest of World War II!

In January, the Red Army went on the offensive, the Wehrmacht started transferring divisions to the eastern front – the German offensive ended.

As history shows, the Anglo-Americans carried out the most successful military operations against their opponents by bribing the enemy Generals.
They did it in Iraq, they did it in Libya, they tried to do it in Syria, and now they are trying to do it in Venezuela.

By the time of operation Market Garden, most of the conspirators in the German General Staff had been shot by Hitler. Those who were not exposed and shot laid low. The Anglo-Americans failed to take Berlin at the expense of the Generals’ treachery. And when they tried to win the battle on their own without the support of traitors in the German General Staff, they were immediately defeated in operation Market Garden.

After this, they sat and waited quietly for the Soviet troops to defeat Germany and the western front to collapse itself!

In my opinion, after reading the above facts no doubts should remain about why the allies did not storm Berlin!

Anatoly Gusev

Copyright © 2022. All Rights Reserved.