NEW – August 12, 2022
Recently, the topic of attacks on the nuclear power plant has been raised quite often due to its severity. And the more often it happens, the more people begin to realise what thin ice we are all walking on right now.
I would like to consider this issue from the perspective of the likely motivation of the attackers:
It is obvious that the shelling of the nuclear power plant is not an independent invention of the Ukrainian president. This is primarily evident in the crazy audacity of the plan on the one hand, and blatant attempts to smooth out the blame for the shelling by means of not only Western media (already traditionally), but also by the UN executive bodies!!! These friends distinguished themselves by directly preventing the IAEA mission from being sent to the power plant.
Such a mission could (probably fairly impartially) assess threats, where they come from, and mainly the results of such a mission would be made public in the Western information field. (and as we know, this should not be allowed).
Both factors, as well as the fact that nuclear ash from the ruins of the station will not fly across the Atlantic, are highly likely to indicate that the idea is American. Apparently, the enemy decided to raise the stakes in the game, in view of the tactics of conducting combat operations chosen by our military-political work, and the absence of the effects of sanctions that the enemy was counting on.
The question arises, what exactly do they want us to do?
1. At the moment, the desired outcome is the option of transferring the nuclear power plant under the control of Ukraine. This idea has already been heard from various characters in remote parts of the galaxy. The idea is clear: the Russians are aware of the tragic consequences of further shelling, they give up the nuclear power plant, and therefore the surrounding territories – the “victory” is obvious. Here you will find a counterattack and a corresponding media image, and even possible sketches in the style of Bucha. (discovery of “facts” of horrific crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces in the occupation zone). As an alternative, a relatively “soft option”is also proposed. A demilitarised zone, blue helmets, “observers” of various missions, and the “good” that they carry.
2. Since the probability that the Russian military-political work will bend and agree to an agreement on the first option is quite low, therefore the enemy is likely to achieve the following effects:
As the demands for protecting the sky above the nuclear power plant increase, Russia is forced to pull additional air defence systems into the area of the nuclear power plant, thereby exposing other parts of the front. In addition, the danger of the situation will force one to shoot down not only missiles over the territory of the nuclear power plant, but also artillery shells. And this is an obvious overspend of funds and resources that could have been used elsewhere and with greater effect. The offensive potential in other areas is significantly reduced.
2.2 Now the attacks are rather sluggish, but if desired, they can arrange a massive one. Repeated experience has shown that in the case of a massive attack, the probability of a complete repulse of the attack cannot be 100%. Something will fly right through. If the spent nuclear fuel dome or storage facility is breached, the area may become contaminated with radioactive material. It is not difficult to guess that we will have to deal with the liquidation, all the blame will be hung on us. Experience in dealing with accidents at nuclear power plants shows that the elimination of such consequences requires enormous human and material resources. The consequence is a significant change in the timing and possibly the course of the special military operation in Ukraine.
2.3 The constant threat of disaster will force the Russian Federation to change its tactics of warfare. The enemy compels to force the elimination of the UAF grouping that threatens the nuclear power plant. And here it is possible to achieve several effects simultaneously. A forced attack on the strongholds will be accompanied by increased losses among the personnel and equipment of the Russian Federation. Since the Ukrainian Armed Forces like to place fire weapons near civilian objects, numerous civilian casualties are also very likely. The result is an obvious “victory”, a media picture with victims – all that the Western information machine likes to pedal so much.
2.4 We should not forget that the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant is the largest in Europe, with an electric capacity of 6 GW, and a huge infrastructure facility on which the region’s economy is based. 6 power units, the comparative cost of construction by modern methods and technologies is not less than 240 billion rubles and from 5 to 7 years for each power unit.
Reasonable enough people understand that in the absence of miracles, Russia will retain control of the station. And if a negative scenario is implemented, the operation of such an object will become impossible, and we will receive an economic blow comparable to little else. It also plays into the hands of provocateurs that the nuclear power plant is closer to Russia than to Western Europe, and all sorts of Moldova, Romania and other countries are probably not so sorry for Hungary.
Given all the above, and the fact that the attacks on the nuclear power plant are not yet massive, we are given time. Most likely, the West is forcing the Russian Federation to negotiate. What exactly do they want to demand? As is said, we will see…
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